IN SEARCH OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES TOWARD CHILDREN
UNDER A POST-DESHANEY CONSTITUTION
AMY SINDENI
INTRODUCTION

As public awareness and concern about child abuse have
increased in recent decades, 1 more and more resources have been
directed toward efforts to protect children from dangerous home
situations. 2 In the past thirty years, laws have been passed in all
fifty states requiring certain professionals to report suspected child
abuse and creating state and county agencies to receive and
investigate such reports. 3 Since 1960, the number of children
reported to child welfare agencies as suspected victims of abuse or
neglect has increased dramatically, 4 as has the number of children
in foster care.5 Although most professionals now agree that child
abuse and neglect occur in all socioeconomic classes, 6 the vast
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1 Social concern about child abuse in the United States has waxed and waned over
the past 300 years. For a summary of the history of child protection since the 17th
century, including the recent resurgence of interest, see Oren, The State's Failureto
Protect Childrenand Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Contex 68 N.C.L. REV. 659,
665-69 (1990).
2 While in 1963 the federal government spent only a few million dollars on child
protective services, by 1980 that expenditure had risen to over $325 million. See
Besharov, Right Versus Rights: The Dilemma of Child Protection, 43 PUB. WELFARE 19, 20
(1985).
3 See Oren, supra note 1, at 668, 702.
4 The number of children reported has increased during this period at least tenfold.
See Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Children Outruns the
Ability to Improve ParentalFunctioning,20 FAM. L.Q. 213 (1986) (noting approximately
150,000 children reported in 1963 and 1,500,000 reported in 1984); see also U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1989, at 172

(1989) (Table 291) (counting over 1,900,000 children reported in 1985).
This dramatic statistical increase may actually reflect the effects of mandatory
reporting laws, increased awareness among the public, and a broadening of the
definition of child abuse over the past 30 years, rather than an actual increase in the
incidence of child abuse. SeeJohnson, Symbolic Salvation: The ChangingMeanings of the
Child Maltreatment Movement 6 STUD. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 289 (1985).
5 The number of children placed in foster care due to allegations of abuse or neglect
rose from approximately 75,000 in 1963 to over 300,000 in 1980. See Besharov, supra
note 4, at 218.
6 See Stewart, Senger, Kallen, & Scheurer, Family Violence in Stable Middle-Class
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majority of families reported to and investigated by child welfare
7
agencies are poor.
Thus, the child welfare agency has increasingly become a major
presence in poor communities. Given the resources and legal
authority they possess, such agencies have the power to be both a
source of great help and a source of great harm to these communities. While their laudable mission is to save children, child
protective social workers also have the capacity to cause serious
harm to children. They must strike a delicate balance between the
risk of injury to the child in the home and the risk of destroying
desperately needed family bonds through overly intrusive intervention. An error in either direction can have catastrophic consequences for the child. Failure to remove, in the most extreme
situations, can lead to serious injury or even death,8 but removing
a child from her home will inevitably result in emotional injury that
may be worse than that which the child might have suffered at
home. 9 Moreover, foster care itself does not always offer children

Homes, 32 Soc. WORK 529 (1987).
7 A national study conducted. in 1986 found that children from families with
incomes of less than $15,000 were reported to child protective services and other
agencies as maltreated at five times the rate of other children. See NATIONAL CENTER
ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE OF

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 1988, at 5-41 (1988). Another study showed that in 1984
approximately 48% of all children reported to child protective services were from
families receiving public assistance. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 4, at
172 (Table 291). Some studies suggest that children from poor and minority families
are more likely to be labeled "abused" than middle and upper class children who are
more likely to be assumed to be victims of accidents. See Hampton, Race, Class and
Child Maltreatmen 18 J. COMP. FAMq. STUD. 113, 114 (1987).
While middle and upper income families can afford to buy the social services they
need during times of crisis, indigent families are dependent on public agencies. Many
of the cases that come to an agency's attention as neglect cases stem directly from
poverty. Thus, a mother may have difficulty caring for her children because of
homelessness or inadequate living quarters, lack of day care, or because of the stresses
caused by these conditions. See Lowry, Dering-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact
Litigation After the Warren Year, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255, 257-58 (1986). It has also been
suggested that since the poor, by virtue of their participation in welfare programs, are
more likely to have their private lives scrutinized by state-employed social workers, they
are more likely to be reported to child welfare agencies. See Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards for Removal of Children From Their Homes,
Monitoringthe Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 629 n.21 (1976).
8 In 1987, over 1100 children died from abuse nationwide. See Shapiro & Shapiro,
Tomomow: The Epidemic of ChildAbuse Turns Deadly, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 11,
1988, at 35.
9 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 9-25 (1979); Fein & Maluccio, Children Leaving Foster Care: Outcomes of
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the safe haven from physical and emotional abuse that it is
supposed to provide.' 0 Yet despite the importance of the judgments that we entrust them to make, and the devastating consequences of error, child protective social workers are generally
poorly paid, inadequately trained, and overworked. 1 As a result,
2
the judgments they make may too often be wrong.'
Attempts have been made to hold child welfare agencies
accountable for the tragic effects of their most egregious mistakes
through federal court actions under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 187113 alleging violations of the child-victim's constitutional
rights.1 4 Yet, while wrongful removal of a child by an agency
Permanency Planning 8 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 425 (1984); Lowry, supra note 7, at
257; Wald, supra note 7, at 644-46. Foster children are often traumatized by being
shuffled from home to home without any opportunity to develop bonds with any one
set of foster parents. This only compounds the feelings of loss and abandonment that
a child inevitably feels upon being removed from her natural family. See Mushlin,
Havens: The Casefor ConstitutionalProtectionof Foster Childrenfrom Abuse and Neglec 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (1988).
10 Some studies show the rates of abuse and neglect in foster homes to be
substantially higher than in the general population. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE
REPORTING, at 10-11 (1978) (Table 2) (showing rates of substantiated abuse in foster
care ranged as high as ten times greater than rates in the general population); Mushlin,
supra note 9, at 206 nn.29-30 (finding the rate of substantiated abuse and neglect in
foster family homes in New York City to be one-and-a-half times that in the general
population (citing VERA INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, FOSTER HOME CHILD PROTECTION 63-64
(1981))); see also Nunno & Motz, The Development of an Effective Response to the Abuse of
Children in Out-of-Home Care, 12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 521-22 (1988) (discussing a
study indicating that fatalities from abuse and neglect in foster homes may be two or
three times that of the general population). But see M. WALD, J. CARLSMITH & P.
LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 183-87 (1988) (reporting
a multi-year study showing that children may be better off in foster care than with their
natural parents in some circumstances).
11 See Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection Systen, 35 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1973); Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutoiy
Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633, 649 (1981).
12 Studies in some states have indicated that 25% of all child fatalities attributed to
abuse or neglect involved children who were previously reported to a child welfare
agency. See Nunno & Motz, supra note 10, at 522.
13 Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United Sates or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
14 See Lowry, supra note 7, at 264.
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clearly involves state action in violation of the child's and her
parents' rights under the fourteenth amendment, many of the other
mistaken judgments committed by child welfare agencies and their
social workers result not in a clearly definable action on the part of
the agency, but rather in the agency's failure to act. Thus, a child
who is seriously injured at the hands of her parents or foster
parents may seek to hold the agency liable for its failure to take
action to protect her. 1 5 Similarly, a child in foster care who could
return home safely if certain protective services were provided to
her or her family may seek to hold the agency liable for itsfailure to
16
provide those services.
Imposing liability for a state's failure to act under the Constitution, however, poses very serious difficulties.
Judge Posner
observed that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might do too little for the people but
that it might do too much to them."17 This view from the Seventh
Circuit is gaining wider acceptance among members of the federal
bench. Last year in DeS.haney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, i8 the United States Supreme Court adopted this
Posnerian stance in response to an attempt to hold a child welfare
agency liable under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment for its failure to protect four-year-oldJoshua DeShaney
from near fatal abuse by his father. Despite the fact that the agency
had been supervising the family for over a year and was aware of the
serious risk of abuse faced by the child, the Court held that the
15 See e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998,
1001 (1989); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792-93 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503,509 (3d
Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985).
16 See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1250 (9th Cir. 1989), reh'ggranted,
907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Aristotle P. v.Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1006
(N.D. Ill. 1989), leave to appealgranted, No. 88-C-7919 (N.D. 111. Oct. 3 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Artist M. v.Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D. Il. 1989);
Black v. Beame, 419 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 550 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.
1977).
17
Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). For an argument that the fourteenth amendment was
originally intended to radically alter this negative-liberties orientation of the Constitution by imposing affirmative duties on government, see Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of
Slaughter-House: A Critiqueof a Negative Rights View of the Constitution,43 VAND. L. RExV.
409 (1990).
18 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
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agency "had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his
19
father's violence."
This Comment examines the possibilities that remain after the
DeShaney decision for imposing affirmative constitutional duties on
child welfare agencies. Part I examines the DeShaney opinion itself
and argues that most courts are reading the decision too broadly.
A careful reading of the text indicates that the decision actually
forecloses affirmative governmental duties in a smaller range of
cases than most courts seem to have assumed. Part II discusses the
implications of DeShaney with regard to actions seeking to impose
liability on child welfare agencies for abuse and neglect of children
in foster care and argues for an interpretation of the opinion that
will foreclose such liability in fewer instances. Part III discusses a
number of possible factual situations other than abuse and neglect
in foster care, that might escape the DeShaney bar and support a
finding of an affirmative duty to protect on the part of child welfare
agencies. Part IV considers the potential scope of affirmative
constitutional duties beyond a duty of protection that may be
imposed on agencies, such as a duty to provide the substantive
services necessary to reunite foster children with their natural
parents. Finally, Part V briefly discusses the other constitutional
arguments left untouched by DeShaney that may also be used to
argue for the imposition of affirmative duties on child welfare
agencies.
I. THE DESHANEY CASE
A. The Facts
On March 8, 1984, four-year-oldJoshua DeShaney was beaten so
severely by his father that half of his brain was destroyed.2" As a
result, Joshua is now permanently brain-damaged and profoundly
retarded and is expected to remain institutionalized for the rest of
his life. 2 1 A medical examination indicated that this had not been
the first time that Joshua had been seriously injured by his father's
blows. 22 Scars of varying ages were found all over his body and a
19 Id. at 1007.
See Brief for Petitioners at 8, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social

20

Servs., 109 S. Ct. 988 (1989) (No. 87-154).
21 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
2

See id.
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neurosurgeon's examination revealed evidence of previous traumat23
ic head injury.
The preceding year, Joshua had been taken to the emergency
room with suspicious injuries, and the Department of Social Services
(DSS) had arranged for the hospital to hold him for several days
while they investigated.2 4 The result of that investigation was to
release Joshua back to his father because of insufficient evidence,
despite the fact that abuse was strongly suspected.25 The case was
subsequently dismissed from court without a hearing, but during the
following year DSS continued to monitor the family. 26 Although
there were repeated signs of abuse, including several more visits to
the emergency room with suspicious injuries, the DSS social worker
assigned to the case took no action except to visit the family
sporadically-no more than once a month-and during two of these
visits she did not actually see the child.2 7 It was clear, however,
that she believed Joshua to be at serious risk, since afterward she
said to his mother, "I just knew the phone would ring someday and
28
Joshua would be dead."
Joshua, through his guardian ad litem and his mother, brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, the caseworker assigned to the case,
and her supervisor, alleging that their failure to take action to
protect Joshua constituted a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 29 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
and that ruling was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit and then by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, focused on the issue of duty, holding that the due
process clause did not impose an affirmative duty on the state to
protect Joshua from his father's violence.3 0
"The Clause is
23 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 7-8.

24 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
2 See id.
26 See id.

27 See id. at 1001-02.

28 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 8.
2 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
so See id. at 1007. For criticisms of the Supreme Court's opinion, see Gerhardt,
supra note 17, at 409; Oren, supra note 1, at 683-717; Strossen, Recent U.S. Into-national
JudicialProtectionof IndividualRights: A ComparativeLegal ProcessAnalysis and Proposed
Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 805, 873 (1990); Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace:
What Lawyers Can Learn From Modem Physics, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989); Note,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The NarrowingScope of Constitutional Torts, 49 MD. L.
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phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not
as a
" l
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. 3
B. Arguingfor a ConstitutionalDuty: The Special
Relationship Theory
It is well-established that the Constitution generally does not
impose duties on the State to provide care or protection to its
citizens. 32 The DeShaney plaintiffs, however, argued that this case
involved a special circumstance in which the state did have a
constitutional duty to act by virtue of the "special relationship" that
existed between the state and Joshua. The defendants were
specifically aware of the particular danger faced by Joshua: they
"proclaimed, by word and by deed, [their] intention to protect him
against that danger"3 3 and actually undertook to so protect him.
Moreover, the defendants were specifically charged under Wisconsin
law with the responsibility of protecting children from abuse. For
these reasons, the plaintiffs claimed, the defendants had a special
relationship withJoshua, which imposed on them a special constitutional duty of protection toward him which they did not owe to the
34

public at large.

At the time the case was argued, this special relationship theory
had been endorsed by the Third and Fourth Circuits in cases similar
to DeShaney. Estate of Bailey v. County of York3 5 involved a five year
REv. 484 (1990).
31 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003. Since the Court found no duty to act, it did not
reach a number of other issues implicated by this case, including. the issue of
causation, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); the "state of mind" on the
part of the defendant that is necessary to trigger the protections of the due process
clause-i.e. negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference, see
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); whether the injuries alleged were a result of
a policy or custom of the Department, as required by Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its progeny; or whether the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Clearly,
any § 1983 action against a child welfare agency for failure to act that escapes the
limitations set by DeShaney and establishes a duty to act, will still have to face these
hurdles as well as possible eleventh amendment immunity problems in instances in
which the child welfare agency is state-run. These additional issues, however, are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
12 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("As a general matter, a state
is under no obligation to provide substantive services for those within its border." (citing
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980) (no duty to provide abortions); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (no duty to provide medical services)).
33 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
34 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 18-20.
-5 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
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old girl who was beaten to death by her mother or mother's
paramour while the family was under the supervision of the county
child welfare agency. The Third Circuit held that the facts
alleged-that the agency was specifically aware of the child's plight
and had previously temporarily removed the child from her
mother's custody because of suspected abuse-were sufficient to
establish a special relationship between the agency and the child,
such that the agency could be found constitutionally liable for its
failure to protect her. The Third Circuit relied heavily on a recent
Fourth Circuit case, Jenson v. Conrad,36 which had dismissed a
similar claim on immunity grounds but suggested in dicta that a
37
special relationship could exist under such facts.
This concept of a special relationship triggering an affirmative
duty to act has been borrowed directly from common law tort
doctrine, which shares with constitutional law a sharp distinction
between action and inaction. 3 8
Tort law imposes liability on
parties for their "misfeasance" or affirmative acts that cause injury
to others, but not for their "nonfeasance" or failure to protect or

help another person. 39 When, however, a "special relationship"
between the parties exists, there is an exception to the rule of no
liability for nonfeasance, and the defendant may be held liable for
40
her failure to act in aid of another.

36 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
37 Although this dicta inJenson was called into question by the Supreme Court in
DeShaney, a recent district court opinion from the Fourth Circuit indicates that the
Jenson dicta regarding special relationship is still being afforded weight, at least in cases
that are factually distinguishable from DeShaney. See Swader v. Virginia, No. 90-1111-N
(E.D. Va. July 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); see also infra note 81.
The plaintiffs in DeShaney also relied on two cases from the Second and Eleventh
Circuits that found a special-relationship duty of protection toward children in foster
care. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 13-14, 16-17 (relying on Doe v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983), and Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989)). While both cases involved children in the custody of the state,
both decisions indicated that custody is not essential to the existence of an affirmative
state duty.
38 Amici in DeShaney argued that this distinction between action and inaction is
unworkable and "illusory." See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties
Union Children's Rights Project in Support of Petitioners at 46-52, DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 888 (1989) (No. 87-154)
[hereinafter A.C.L.U. Amicus Brief].
39 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW

OF TORTS
§ 56 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
40
Id. § 56.
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C. The Relevance of Common Law Tort Doctrine
Although Joshua DeShaney's claim could be described as a

"constitutional tort,"4 1 it is clear that common law tort doctrine is

not controlling in such a case.42 Just as negligently inflicted injury
does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation under the
Supreme Court's holding in Daniels v. Williams,43 there is no
reason to assume that all of the duties imposed by common law
under the special relationship doctrine are also imposed on
government officials by the Constitution. Because constitutional
torts impose liability on government rather than private persons, the
policy considerations involved are clearly different. Additionally,
constitutional torts must be anchored in the Constitution, which
generally is read to impose limits on government action rather than
inaction. 44 In fact, the federal courts generally have been unwilling to expand constitutional liability for government officials' failure
to act as far as the common law has expanded liability for nonfea45
sance under the "special relationship" doctrine.
41 See Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape, and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 277, 323-24 (1965).
42 See e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (stating that the
fourteenth amendment does not constitutionalize every common-law duty owed by
government officials); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (holding that every
injury inflicted by a state official under "color of law" is not a violation of the fourteenth
amendment); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) ("Section 1983 imposes
liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties
of care arising out of tort law."); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (stating that the
due process clause is not a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems
may already be administered by the states").
It is important to note that a § 1983 case like DeShaney involves two intellectually
distinct levels at which a tort-like analysis might be employed. Thus the question of
whether an official has subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution under § 1983 is distinct from the question of whether the official has
deprived the plaintiff of life, liberty or property under the due process clause. Tort law
concepts maybe imported into either one of these analyses. The DeShaney case and this
Comment deal only with the due process clause inquiry. Thus the Supreme Court's
statement in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds,
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that "section [1983]
should be read against the background of tort liability" is irrelevant for our purposes
here.
43 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
44 See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 864
(1986).
45
See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(holding no constitutional liability for fire dispatcher's refusal to provide rescue services
requested by plaintiff), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Wideman v. Shallowford, 826
F.2d 1030, 1035-37 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that mother of a prematurely-delivered
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Still, with an understanding that the common law is not controlling, it is helpful to look to the original common law definition of
"special relationship" in analyzing the attempts that have been made
to import this theory into constitutional law. Tort law enumerates
four basic types of special relationships: 1) that which arises when
the defendant acts affirmatively to cause the peril faced by the
plaintiff, 2) that which arises when the defendant undertakes to
rescue the plaintiff, 3) that dependent upon the status of the parties
(e.g. parent-child, landlord-tenant), and 4) that which arises when
46
there is a contract between the parties.
The plaintiffs in DeShaney argued that a special relationship of
the second and/or third types made the defendants liable for their
inaction. 47 Thus, the Department of Social Services had a special
relationship with Joshua both because it had already undertaken to
rescue him through its prior involvement with his family and
because of its status as the child protective agency that was
monitoring Joshua's situation. 48 While the Supreme Court clearly
rejected these proffered definitions of a special relationship, it did
not reject altogether a special relationship doctrine for constitutional torts. Indeed, the Court could not have done so without
breaking with a well-established line of precedent imposing a
constitutional duty on government officials to protect prisoners and
the institutionalized mentally disabled.4 9 I argue that the Supreme
Court's analysis in DeShaney essentially limited the special relationship theory as applied to constitutional torts to type one above, in
which the peril is caused by the defendant. Thus the Court's
holding that the state was under no constitutional duty to protect
Joshua was based on its finding that the state had not created the
danger that he faced.

infant had no fourteenth amendment claim against county and county ambulance
drivers for their refusal to drive her to the hospital of her choice); Estate of Gilmore v.
Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,720-22 (1st Cir.) (concluding that prison officials and psychiatrist
were not constitutionally liable for their failure to protect woman murdered by an
inmate released on furlough), cer., denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
46 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 39, § 56.

47 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 18-20.
48 See id.
49 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-06.
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D. Precedentfor a Special Relationship in ConstitutionalTorts
1. The duty to those in state custody
Prior to DeShaney, the Supreme Court had already found government officials constitutionally liable for their failure to act in certain
circumstances. In Estelle v. Gamble,5 ° the Court held that prison
officials' failure to provide medical treatment to prisoners could be
a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983. Although
this decision rested on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment, the principle was later extended to institutional settings outside of the prison context under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.. Youngberg v. Romeo51 established an affirmative duty on the part of state officials to provide
mentally retarded persons who are involuntarily committed to state
institutions with reasonable safety, freedom from unnecessary
restraint, and training as is necessary to ensure such safety and
freedom.

52

In the language of tort doctrine, these cases stand for the
proposition that in certain circumstances a "special relationship"
exists between the state and the individual such that the Constitution imposes on the state an affirmative duty to act to provide care
and/or protection to the individual.53 The plaintiffs in DeShaney
relied heavily on Estelle and Youngberg in their argument, and the
Court in ruling against them was forced to distinguish these cases.
Most of the DeShaney opinion, in fact, is devoted to defining the
boundaries of Youngberg and Estelle so as to clearly place DeShaney
outside those boundaries. It is important to look closely at how the
Court made this distinction in order to understand exactly where
the contours of the special relationship theory now lie.
50 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
51 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
52 See id at 324.
5
1In the constitutional context the term "special relationship" has usually been used
only in cases that extend an affirmative duty of protection beyond situations where the
individual is in state custody. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503,
510-11 (3rd Cir. 1985) (finding a special relationship between a child welfare agency and
a child living at home under agency supervision). The term was not actually used by
the Court in Estelle or Youngberg. In the interests of clarity and consistency, however,
I use the term in this Comment to refer to any instance in which the due process clause
imposes a duty to act on the state, including Youngberg-type cases in which the individual
is in state custody.
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While the Court in DeShaney clearly rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that a special relationship was established by the state's
undertaking to rescueJoshua (type two) or by the defendant's status
as a child protection agency (type three), 54 a superficial reading of
DeShaney suggests that the Court has set up another status-based test
for special relationship, asking whether or not the plaintiff is in the
custody of the state. 55 Under this reading, the Court simply found
that the special relationship established in Youngberg and Estelle need
not apply to DeShaney, since the plaintiffs in those cases were in
state custody and Joshua DeShaney was not. This is in fact how
most lower courts have been reading the decision. 56 I argue,
however, that the opinion can be more accurately and usefully read
as creating a definition of special relationship of type number one
above. 5 7 Where the state has played some role in creating the
peril faced by the plaintiff, then a special relationship exists such
that the state has a duty to act. Situations where the state has taken
an individual into custody fit within this definition but comprise
only a subset of all possible special relationships.
2. The Special Relationship Duty Outside the Custody Context
A state-created-danger theory of special relationship in constitutional torts is not new. An earlier line of lower federal court
decisions, originating in the Seventh Circuit, has found a constitutional state duty to act in situations where the state created the
danger:

58

If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say

54 See supra text accompanying note 46.
55 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
56 See, e.g., Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City
of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that, afterDeShaney,"the state
continues to owe an affirmative duty to protect those physically in its custody");
Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1215 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The implications of
DeShaney ... are clear, and devastating. The United States did not trigger the due
process clause because it never took [the plaintiffs] into its custody."); Griffin v. Carlisle,
No. 89-0603 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (finding food
service worker at juvenile detention facility not constitutionally entitled to state
protection against inmates because "the relationship between [the] plaintiff and the state
[was] not one of custody, but merely one of employment"); see also Oren, supra note 1,
at 683.
57
See supra text accompanying note 46.
5 See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381 (7th Cir. 1979); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).

1990)

AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES TOWARD CHILDREN

that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor
59
as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.
In Byrd v. Brishke,6 ° the Seventh Circuit held that police
officers could be liable under section 1983 for their failure to
protect a person beaten by other police officers in their presence.
In White v. Rochford,61 the court held that police officers, who
arrested the guardian of three children for drag racing and then left
the children alone in an abandoned automobile along the side of a
highway on a cold evening, could be found liable under section
1983 for their failure to protect the children. These decisions have
been widely followed in other circuits. 62 They were not mentioned
by the Court in DeShaney63 and apparently survive that decision,
even though these cases effectively create a constitutional specialrelationship duty in situations that do not involve a state custodial
6 4
relationship.
E. The Text of the Opinion
A textual examination of the DeShaney opinion demonstrates
that the Court's analysis actually rested on the state-created-danger
definition of special-relationship, rather than a status-based custody
test, even though there is language in the opinion which, taken
alone, seems to point in the direction of a simple custody test.

59 Bower, 686 F.2d at 618.
60 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
61 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
62 See First, "PoorJoshua!":The State's Responsibility to Protect Childrenfrom Abuse, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 525, 532 (1989).
6
This is a conspicuous omission since the decisions were discussed in the Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 20, at 12, 17, and in the Seventh Circuit DeShaney opinion, 812
F.2d at 303, as well as in virtually every other case involving the special relationship
theory. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1988)
(addressing the failure to provide requested rescue squad), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510 (3d Cir. 1985) (addressing
the failure to protect abused child); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 191-94 (4th Cir.
1984) (same), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
64 Citing DeShaney in support of its holding, a recent Ninth Circuit decision clearly
follows this line of cases in finding a special relationship in a non-custodial situation in
which the state created the danger. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that a police officer who arrested driver of car for drunk driving,
impounded vehicle, and left female passenger stranded at night in high-crime area
where she was raped by a stranger from whom she accepted a ride, had an affirmative
duty to protect the passenger because he created the danger she faced); see also
Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 355-57 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding
that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and town because she was compelled
by her position as town clerk to be exposed to inmate work squads); infra note 81.
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Thus, after discussing Estelle and Youngberg, the Court stated that
"[these cases] stand only for the proposition that when the State
takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
65
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being."
However, in the following sentence the Court further refined its
characterization of Estelle and Youngberg,66 emphasizing not the
custodial status of the state's relationship with the individual, but
the action taken by the state which placed the individual in a
67
dangerous situation.
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State
by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs ... it transgresses the substantive limits on state action
set by the Eighth
68
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Chief Justice Rehnquis: continued by stating, "[I]t is the state's
affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his
own behalf.., which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the
protections of the Due Process Clause ... ."69 Thus, according to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Youngberg and Estelle, it was the state's
act of taking the plaintiff into state custody that set the stage for the
ensuing injury. The special relationship analysis in these cases turns
not simply on whether the plaintiffs were in state custody, but also
on whether the state's act in taking them into custody created the
danger. In DeShaney, on the other hand, at least in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's eyes, the state "played no part in [the] creation [of the
65 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
66
For a discussion of these two cases,
6

see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
7Itis possible to read Youngbeng as defining a status-based special relationship. In
finding a special relationship duty to exist,Justice Powell seemed to emphasize Romeo's

status in relation to the state, more than the state's affirmative action in institutionalizing him. See Youngberg 457 U.S. at 317 ("When a person is institutionalized-and wholly
dependent on the State[-]... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist").
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, however, as discussed above, cast the decision in a different

light.
r' DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06 (emphasis added). Similarly, while the Court
observed that "the harms Joshua suffered did not occur while he was in the State's
custody," the next sentence indicated that the Court's real concern was whether the
state created the danger: "While the State may have been aware of the dangers that
Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything
to render him any more vulnerable to them." Id. at 1006 (emphasis added).
69 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 (emphasis added).
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dangers that Joshua faced]," 70 and thus there was no special
relationship.
The state-created-danger test seems to turn, at least partly, on
a causal analysis. In order to find an affirmative duty arising from
a special relationship, we must be able to point to some affirmative
action by the state that is a but-for cause of the injury.7 1 Thus,
Nicholas Romeo would not have been injured but for the fact that
the state committed him to Pennhurst, 72 and a prisoner who was
denied medical treatment would presumably have had that treatment but for the fact that she was incarcerated by the state. 73 The
"snake pit" line of cases also follow this analysis. 74 Thus, in White
v. Rochford,75 the children would not have been left alone on the
side of the highway but for the action of the police in arresting their
6
custodian.

7

Moreover, it is clear that the state's danger-creating act must
involve some element of involuntary submission by the individual to
the state's power or authority. 77 The DeShaney opinion repeatedly
emphasized the involuntary nature of the plaintiff's confinement in
both Estelle and Youngberg and the fact that the state had acted
70

Id.

71

Itis important to note that this causation inquiry occurs within the duty analysis

and is distinct from the standard causation inquiry that ultimately determines tort
liability (i.e., the causation element of the duty-breach-causation-damages analysis). The
latter inquiry asks whether the defendant's breach (here the failure to act) was a
necessary antecedent condition to a reasonably foreseeable injury. In contrast, the dutycausation inquiry asks whether some previous, non-breaching act (i.e., imprisoning or
institutionalizing the plaintiff), was a necessary antecedent condition to the plaintiff's
injury. Here the causal chain may be fairly attenuated; the foreseeability requirement
is lessened, and intervening causes do not break the causal chain.
72 See Youngberg 457 U.S. 307.
73 See Estelle, 429 U.S. 97.
74 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
75 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
76 In DeShaney, the majority found no state action that had even incrementally
contributed to the cause ofJoshua's injuries. Instead, the state "placed him in no worse
position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all .... " DeShaney,
109 S. Ct. at 1006.
77 Without this additional criterion, the but-for causation test alone would produce
absurd results. For example, it seems unlikely that ChiefJustice Rehnquist meant to
argue that since a state's act in issuing an adoption decree is a but-for cause of an
adopted child's injuries at the hands of her adoptive parents, the state should owe a
special-relationship duty of protection to every adopted child. This involuntariness
requirement is not the only way the but-for test could have been effectively limited.
Notions of proximate cause might have served the same purpose. See infra notes 134-53
and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of applying the involuntariness requirement).
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78
coercively in those cases.. "restrain[ing] an individual's liberty,"
imposing "limitation ... on his freedom to act on his own behalf,"79 and "hold[ing] him [in custody] against his will."8 0
Thus, the special relationship test that emerges from DeShaney
is not simply whether the plaintiff is in state custody. The test asks
whether some affirmative state action, taken without the plaintiffs
consent, has sufficiently altered the plaintiffs situation such that it
can be said to be a but-for cause of her injury.81
Certainly,

78

DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.

79 Id. at 1006.
80 Id.

at 1005.
81 A few courts have interpreted DeSlaney in this way to find a special relationship
in non-custodial situations in which the state created the danger. In Cornelius v. Town
of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1lth Cir. 1989), a town clerk, who was abducted from
the town hall, held hostage and terrorized for three days by prison inmates assigned to
a community work squad, sought to hold the town and its officials liable under § 1983
for violation of her due process rights. The Court found that these allegations could
support the existence of a special relationship under the standard set forth in DeShaney,
because "the defendants did indeed create the dangerous situation of the inmates'
presence in the community by establishing the work squad and assigning the inmates
to work around the town hall." Id. at 356.
In a similar case, Swader v. Virginia, No. 90-1111-N (E.D. Va. July 19, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the daughter of a prison employee, who was required
as a condition of employment to live on the prison grounds, was brutally raped and
murdered by an inmate who was negligently permitted outside the fenced-in area of the
prison without the accompaniment of a guard. The court observed that "a central part
to the [Supreme] Court's analysis [in DeShaney was] the fact that the State played no
part in the creation of the dangers that harmedJoshua, nor did the state do anything
to render him more vulnerable to those dangers." Id. at 17. Because in this case, "not
only did the State play a part in making [the girl] more vulnerable to the dangers which
led to her death, but ... the State actually played a part in the creation of those
dangers," the court found a special relationship duty of protection to exist. Id.; see also
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that because
police did not create the danger that led to the victims' injuries, they did not owe a
special relationship duty to the victims under DeShaney); Ward v. City of SanJose, 737
F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (concluding that, under DeShaney, police officers
can be held liable pursuant to the fourteenth amendment for their failure to protect
plaintiff against a danger they created).
Another area in which the federal courts have been willing to impose affirmative
constitutional duties on the states is in school desegregation. Although these cases
involve equal protection claims, the analysis is similar to that used in due-process special
relationship cases. Thus, the Constitution may impose an affirmative duty on states to
desegregate public schools, but only in those instances in which some previous
affirmative action by the state (in the form of de jure segregation) created the
discriminatory situation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973)
(stating that "where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling
exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by
statute, the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition
to a racially nondiscriminatory school system'...." (citation omitted)); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (stating that school boards that had operated
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whenever the plaintiff is involuntarily in state custody, it is easy to
show that a special relationship exists, but involuntary custody is not
the litmus test. Such cases are only a subset of the special relationship cases that survive the DeShaney opinion, and there can also be
non-custodial situations which fit within the special relationship
82
doctrine.
F. Majority Versus Dissent: What Constitutes a
"State-CreatedDanger?"
Under this view of the special relationship standard, the dispute
between the majority and dissent in DeShaney appears to be less a
disagreement over which test to apply than over how to apply it. In
his dissent, Justice Brennan also articulated a state-created-danger
standard for special relationships. While Chief Justice Rehnquist,
however, characterized the affirmative state action necessary to
trigger a special relationship as "restraining the individual's freedom
separate black and white school districts were "dearly charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch").
' See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6
(7th Cir. 1972); cases cited supra note 81; see also infra notes 154-58 and accompanying
text. While in DeShaney the Supreme Court deemphasized the role of the state vis-a-vis
Joshua's family situation in order to conclude that the state played no role in the
creation of the dangers he faced, in another recent opinion involving child abuse but
addressing an entirely different legal issue, the Court painted a strikingly different
picture of the relationship between the state and a family under the supervision of a
child welfare agency. In Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct.
990 (1990), the Supreme Court, in an opinion byJustice O'Connor, held that a mother
who retained custody of her child subject to the supervision of the Department of Social
Services could not invoke the fifth amendment to avoid revealing her child's
whereabouts to the Department of Social Services and the juvenile court.
In reaching this holding, the Court emphasized the role of the state in creating the
custodial relationship between Ms. Bouknight and her son. As in DeShaney, Ms.
Bouknight's son had been temporarily removed from her custody because of suspected
abuse and then returned to her custody under the supervision of the Department of
Social Services. Yet, instead of portraying Ms. Bouknight as an autonomous private
actor whose custodial relationship with her son was preexistent and not subject to state
responsibility or control, which would seem most consistent with the DeShaney opinion's
depiction ofJoshua and Randy DeShaney's relationship to the State, this time, the Court
viewed Ms. Bouknight's custody of her son as conferred by the state.
Although the facts suggest an incrementally higher degree of state involvement
here than in DeShaney, in that the child was initially held in foster care for several
months rather than several days and was subsequently adjudicated to be a child in need
of supervision by thejuvenile court and therefore subject to court-ordered supervision,
the Court's portrayal of the situation suggests a radically different vision of the
relationship between the State and families that are subject to supervision by child
welfare agencies.
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to act on his own behalf,"83 Justice Brennan recognized that such
a standard is meaningless in this situation, in which Joshua, a four
year-old child, never had the ability to act on his own behalf at all.
This standard is equally inadequate to explain Youngberg:
[T]he Court's exclusive attention to State-imposed restraints of
"the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf" ... suggests
that it was the State that rendered Romeo unable to care for
himself, whereas in fact-with an I.Q. of between 8 and 10, and the
mental capacity of an 18-month-old child .. . [-] he had been

quite incapable of taking care of himself long before the State
stepped into his life. Thus, the fact of hospitalization was critical
in Youngberg not because it rendered Romeo helpless to help
himself, but because it separated him from other sources of aid
84
that, we held, the State was obligated to replace.
The dissent agreed with the majority that a special relationship
exists when the state affirmatively acts without the individual's
consent, thereby rendering her more vulnerable and creating the
danger she faces. In Youngberg and DeShaney, however, cases in
which the individual was never capable of acting on his own behalf,
the question whether the state had restrained the individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf should have been translated into
the question whether the state had cut off other private sources of
aid to the individual.8 5 The dissent further argued that, on the
facts of this case, the defendant's actions did actively cut off other
sources of aid to Joshua. 86 By establishing the Department of
Social Services as the sole agency to which all reports of child abuse
are made (by private and public persons), and by according the
agency the responsibility to investigate reports and take action to
protect children, the state "relieved ordinary citizens and government bodies other than the Department of any sense of obligation
to do anything more than report their suspicions of child abuse to
DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no one will step
87
in to fill the gap."
While the majority clearly held that the state did not create the
dangers faced byJoshua, such a holding may either have been based
on a specific factual conclusion that the state did not, in this
83 DeSharey, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
84 Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'6
8 See id. at 1010-11 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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instance, cut off any other sources of aid to Joshua, or it may have
been based on a broader legal holding that cutting off other sources
of aid does not, in any instance, constitute an act sufficiently
harmful to meet the state-created-danger standard. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's repeated insistence that the state did not "do anything
to render [Joshua] any more vulnerable to [the danger],"8 8 and
that "it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would
have been had it not acted at all"8 9 points toward a factual holding
that, in this particular situation, the state did not cut off other
sources of aid. Such an interpretation leaves open the possibility
90
that the dissent's argument could be adopted in a later case.
It is apparent that the special relationship theory endorsed by
the Supreme Court in DeShaney does not turn on the question
whether the plaintiff is in state custody at the time of her injury.
Instead, after DeShaney, a special relationship exists whenever the
state acts to create the danger faced by the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff is involuntarily subjected to such danger. While the Court
in DeShaney rejected the argument that the state's action in cutting
off other sources of aid to Joshua established a special relationship
with him, that holding may be read as limited to the specific facts
of the case. Thus, the opinion does not foreclose the possibility
that "cutting off other sources of aid" might establish a special
relationship under a different set of facts.
II. THE

IMPLICATIONS OF DESHANEY FOR CHILDREN ABUSED

IN FOSTER CARE

How would the special relationship analysis have differed if
Joshua had been beaten while in foster care rather than in the
custody of his natural father? The Supreme Court left this question
open in the DeShaney opinion. 91 Eleven days after DeShaney was
88
Id. at 1006 (emphasis added).
89
11. (emphasis added).
90 While the petitioners did make the argument adopted by the dissent-that the
state cut off private sources of aid-they made this argument in the context of a
procedural due process claim that the Court explicitly declined to consider. See Brief
for Petitioners, supranote 20, at 27; see also DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2. They did
not explicitly argue that the defendant's act in cutting off other sources of aid constituted a state-created danger triggering a special-relationship duty. This argument,
however, was extensively argued in the A.C.L.U. Amicus Brief, supra note 38, at 28-34.
91
It explained:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from
free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might
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decided, the Court again declined to consider this question by
denying certiorari in Taylor v. Ledbetter.92 The Eleventh Circuit in
Taylor held that the state did owe a special-relationship duty, under
the due process clause, to a child abused in foster care.
At the time that DeShaney and Taylor reached the Supreme
Court, only a handful of courts had considered the question
whether a special relationship exists between the state and foster
children. 93 In 1976, two decisions of the Southern District of New
York 94 rejected the analogy of foster care to incarceration and
found no special relationship duty to exist. "[T]he state's action in
taking the child plaintiffs into foster care, whether with an institution or foster parent, is not a deprivation of liberty. The state has
merely provided a home for them in substitution for the one the
parents failed to provide." 95 Subsequent cases, however, have
found a substantive due process duty to protect children in foster
care. 96 In 1979, the Southern District of New York held that "[a]
child who is in the custody of the state and placed in foster care has

have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.... We express no view on the
validity of this analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9.
92 791 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part on reh'; 818 F.2d 791
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit
found the liberty interest of the foster child analogous to the liberty interest in
Youngberg:
The state's action in assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the
child in a safe environment placed an obligation on the state to insure the
continuing safety of that environment. The state's failure to meet that
obligation, as evidenced by the child's injuries, in the absence of overriding
societal interests, constituted a deprivation of liberty under the fourteenth
amendment.
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795.
9
3 See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. II. 1985); Brooks
v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Black v. Beame, 419 F. Supp. 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977); Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
94 See Black, 419 F. Supp. 599; Child, 412 F. Supp. 593.
95 Child, 412 F. Supp. at 608. Child challenged the failure to provide adoptive
homes to foster children, and Black challenged the failure to provide housing and
welfare benefits necessary to reunite foster children with their family. These cases
therefore are arguably distinguishable from cases alleging a right to physical safety in
foster care. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
96 See Doe, 649 F.2d at 141; Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 479; Brooks, 478 F. Supp. at
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a constitutional right to at least humane custodial care." 97 In
1981, the Second Circuit held that the foster care situation was
controlled by Estelle, and that the child welfare agency therefore had
an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff from sexual abuse in
foster care. 98 Finally, in 1985, the Northern District of Illinois
held that under Youngberg, the state had a duty to protect a foster
99
child from attacks by other foster children.
The DeShaney opinion leaves the foster child plaintiff with two
major problems. First, courts are interpreting DeShaney to create a
simple custody test for special relationship.10 0 This test not only
derives from an imprecise reading of the DeShaney opinion, 10 1 but
it is also unworkable in practice since it leaves unresolved the
ambiguity inherent in the term "custody." Such a test allows the
state to argue in virtually all cases that the child is not in its actual
custody because the foster parent is a private party over whom the
97

Brooks, 478 F. Supp. at 795.

9

See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981),

8

cer denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
9 See Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Brooks v.
Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases, however, did not resolve
the special relationship question in the foster care context. A number of courts have
held, for purposes of qualified immunity, that a foster child's right to protection from
the state was not dearly established as late as 1984. See e.g., Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d
510, 511 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no dearly established right in 1984), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2560 (1990); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 707-10 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding
no dearly established right from 1974 through 1982), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631
(1990). But see K.H. v. Morgan, No. 89-3158 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, USApp file) ("It should have been obvious from the day Youngberg was decided
that a state could not avoid the responsibilities which that decision had placed on it
merely by delegating custodial responsibility [for foster children] to irresponsible private
persons."); Zemola v.Johnson, No. 89 C 0798 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (concluding that foster child's right to protection was dearly established
by 1982).
10 0
See supranote 56. In most foster-care protection cases decided since DeShanq,
the courts have found that a special-relationship duty toward foster children does exist
under the custody test. See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d
474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990); Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1989),
reh'ggranted, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990); Campbell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 886976 (E.D. Pa.July 18, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); B.H. v.Johnson, 715 F.
Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). But see Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social
Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989) (finding no
special relationship because foster child was found not to be in state custody). A recent
Seventh Circuit opinion by Judge Posner, however, applied a state-created-danger test
for special relationship to conclude that the state owes a duty to children involuntarily
placed in foster care. See K.H. v. Morgan, No. 89-3158 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, USApp file).
101 See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.

248

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:227

state has limited control. 10 2
Secondly, DeShaney appears to
require the plaintiff to be involuntarily subjected to state action in
order for a special relationship to be established. 0 3 The lower
courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that when a
child's foster-care placement is initially authorized by a "voluntary
placement agreement" signed by the parent (as is most often the
case 0 4), this involuntariness requirement is not met, and there is no
10 5
special relationship.
A. Problems Presented by the Custody Test
The meaning of the word "custody" varies significantly depending upon the context in which it is used. Asking whether someone
is in "custody" in a Miranda case is entirely different from asking
whether a child is in "custody" in the context of a domestic relations
dispute. "Custody" does not in and of itself clearly designate a
specific set of parameters for purposes of a special-relationship test.
The word's meaning i:3 especially ambiguous in the foster care
context, in which the rights and responsibilities attendant to custody
may be shared among a number of different entities and individuals. 10 6 State child welfare agencies retain "legal custody" of foster
children in that the court. order permitting the placement of the
child in foster care normadly designates the agency as the custodian. 107 The state agency mnakes the initial decision to petition the
court for placement of the child, along with the subsequent decision
102 This argument may gain additional force when (as is often the case) the state
contracts out the provision of foster care to private agencies, which in turn contract with
individual foster parents.
103 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
104 Estimates of the proportion of all placements that are "voluntary" vary from 50
to 90 percent. See Mushlin, supra note 9, at 238 n.207.
105 See, e.g., Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476 (finding that plaintiff was voluntarily placed in
foster care by his parents); Black v. Beame, 419 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (also
focusing on voluntary placement of child by parents), aff'd, 550 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977);
see also Aristotle P. v.Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (distinguishing
factual circumstances of the case because children involved were not voluntarily placed
in foster care as in Black).
106 The Supreme Court has held that foster children are not in state "custody" for
purposes of habeas corpus relief. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs.
Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982). For a discussion of why the concept of custody creates
an artificial line with little or no relation to who bears actual responsibility for the child,
see Oren, supra note 1, at 704.
107 See Dobbs, Foster Care and Family Law: A Look at Smith v. Offer and the
ConstitutionalRights of Foster Children and Their Families, 17J. FAM. L. 1, 5 (1978).
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as to where to place the child. 0 The agency also retains control
over decisions pertaining to moving the child from one foster home
to another, visiting arrangements
with parents, and returning the
10 9
child to her natural parents.
In many instances, the state agency contracts with a private
foster care agency, which in turn contracts with the foster parents.11 0 The private agency decides which foster family will
receive the child. The private agency usually employs a social
worker who has regular contact with the foster family and exercises
some supervisory authority over day-to-day decisions. Her role may
overlap substantially with that of the state agency social worker, and
the manner in which responsibility is divided between the two
agencies may vary significantly from case to case. One or both
social workers might be involved in dealing with the child's school,
arranging psychological testing and/or treatment, and organizing
visits with the natural parents, in addition to a range of other issues
relating to the care of the child. Although private agencies are not
formally parties to dependency proceedings, their social workers are
frequently included in case plan meetings and pre-trial negotiations
and may exert substantial influence over decisions made by the state
agency and the court as to parental visitation and the ultimate
return of the child.
The foster parent, of course, has physical custody and exercises
authority over most of the day-to-day details of the child's life. The
natural parents, however, retain substantial rights over their
children placed in foster care, including at a minimum the right to
make major medical decisions, the right to be consulted before the
1 11
child is moved, and the right to regular visitation.
Thus, responsibility and decisionmaking authority with regard
to a foster child may frequently be shared among three or four
different parties. 112 The word "custody" or "custodian," without
108

See Wald, supra note 7, at 631.
these decisions are subject to court approval, many courts with overcrowded dockets frequently rubber-stamp the agency's recommendation.
110 See e.g., 55 PA. CODE §§ 3700.1-.73 (1990) (setting guidelines for approval and
supervision of individual foster homes by foster family care agencies).
111 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because ... they have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State."); see also 55 PA. CODE § 3130.68 (1990) (regarding rights of parents to visitation
and to be informed before the child is moved); id. § 3130.91 (requiring parent's
authorization for nonroutine medical treatment).
112 The situation may also be complicated when a hospital takes temporary custody
109While
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a more specific definition, is of little value in determining the rights
and duties of the various parties exercising control over a foster
child.
Two recent Third Circuit opinions, interpreting DeShaney's
"custody" test, demonstrate how malleable the term really is. In
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District,1 3 the court noted that
students required by state law to attend public school could be
viewed as being in the "functional custody" of the state while at
school, such that a special relationship could be held to exist
consistent with DeShaney.114 The Stoneking court, perhaps anticipating that this finding of functional custody might be regarded by
the Supreme Court as too strained a reading of DeShaney, ultimately
based its finding of liability on alternative grounds."15 In Horton
v. Flenory,n 6 the plaintiff was beaten to death by a private club
owner who was purportedly questioning the plaintiff about a crime.
Since the beating occurred with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the police, the court held that the plaintiff was in constructive state
n7
custody.
While in these cases the meaning of the word "custody" was
broadly interpreted to the benefit of the plaintiffs, the term may just
as easily be narrowly construed to the detriment of plaintiffs seeking

of a child pending an investigation, as happened in DeShaney. Seesupra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
n1 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1989), on remand from 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989)
(remanding
in light of DeShaney), atg on other grounds 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988).
114 See id. at 723-24; see also Tilson v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, No. 89-1923 (E.D.
Pa.July 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (noting in dicta that even though
participation of children in a state-run day care program is voluntary, "the tender years
of preschool children and their inability to defend themselves against adult mistreatment favor imposing the same constitutional duty to provide for their reasonable safety
as for institutionalized or incarcerated individuals"); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub.
Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that there exists a special
relationship between the state and school children, which is not barred by DeShaney).
But see 1.0. v. Alton Community Unit School Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that no special relationship exists between state and school children subject to
compulsory school attendance).
115 See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 724 (holding the school district liable for the childplaintiff's injuries from sexual abuse at the hands of a school-employed band director
on the basis of the school district's maintenance of "a practice, custom, or policy of
reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse of students by
teachers ... ." (relying on Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)).
116 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989), on remandfrom City of New Kensington v. Horton,
109 S.Ct. 1334 (1989) (remanding in light of DeShaney), affg In re City of Kensington,
857 F.2d 1463 (3d Cir. 1988).
117 See id. at 458.
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the protection of the state. In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Department of Social Services,118 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a
claim by a child abused in foster care on the grounds that the foster
parent was not a state actor.1 19 This line of reasoning assumes
that "custody," for purposes of special relationship analysis, refers
only to the type of physical custody exercised by the foster parent.
Assuming that only the foster parents could be said to have
"custody" of the child, the court went on to require that the foster
parents be state actors in order to be subject to the fourteenth
120
amendment.
Milburn involved a child who allegedly suffered repeated serious
physical abuse by his foster parents over a period of two years.
During that time, the Maryland Department of Social Services,
which had placed the child in the foster home, took no action to
remove him from the home despite reports of suspected abuse from
the hospital. The child sued the foster parents, the two hospitals,
the county, the county Department of Social Services, and employees thereof under section 1983, alleging deprivation of his rights
under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amend12 1
ments.
In upholding the dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth Circuit
said that the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney was dispositive
and that the facts of DeShaney were virtually "indistinguishable"
from this case. 122 In the court's view, the child was not in the
custody of the state when the injuries occurred, but in the custody
of the foster parents, who were private parties in the same sense
that Joshua DeShaney's father was a private party. Therefore, just
as the state had no obligation to protect Joshua when he was in the
custody of his father, it had no duty to protect a child in the custody
23
of private citizens who happened to be foster parents.
118 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
119 See id at 476-79. The court also based its holding that there was no special

relationship on the fact that the child was voluntarily placed in foster care. The court
summarily resolved the involuntariness issue by observing that the child "was voluntarily
placed in the foster home by his natural parents," without any discussion of whether
such consent on the part of the parents could fairly be attributed to the child. Id. at
476. This same approach has been taken by every court considering a right to
protection claim by a foster child since DeShaney and is discussed in section IlB. See
infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
120 See Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476.
121 See id. at 475.
'2

See id at 476.

123 See id.
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Rather than looking to Youngberg and Estelle to determine what
constitutes state custody for purposes of a special relationship (or
to determine what constitutes a state-created danger), the court
erroneously equated the question of whether the plaintiff was in
state custody for purposes of special relationship analysis with the
question of whether the custodian (foster parent) was a state actor
and thus subject to the fourteenth amendment under Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority124 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.125
These state action cases, discussed at length by the Milburn
court, address an issue that is clearly distinct from the issue of a
special-relationship duty with which DeShaney deals.
The state
action cases ask whether the actions of the defendant can be fairly
attributed to the state such that the defendant can be held to have
violated the fourteenth amendment, which binds only the conduct
of states, not private parties. 26 DeShaney, on the other hand,
asked whether the defendant child welfare agency, which was clearly
an arm of the state, could be held to have deprived someone of life,
liberty or property by its failure to protect that person from the acts
of a private party.' 27 The two inquiries are similar in that they
both ask when the state should be held responsible for the actions
of a private party, but they are doctrinally distinct. In the language
of the due process clause, the special-relationship inquiry asks: has
the state deprived a person of life, liberty, or property? The state
action inquiry asks: was it the state that deprived a person of life,
28
liberty, or property?

124 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
125 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
126 See id. at 349-50; Burton, 365 U.S. at 721-22.
127 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
128
The Fourth Circuit launched into its state action analysis from a vague reference

in the DeShaney opinion to the fact thatJoshua was "in the custody of his natural father,
who was in no sense a state actor." Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S.
Ct. at 1006) (emphasis added). Yet this sentence in and of itself hardly indicates that
the Court's opinion turns on whelherJoshua's father was a state actor in the sense of
Burton and Jackson. It is hard to imagine that the DeShaney Court would, in such a
cursory manner, import into the special-relationship theory all of the complexity and
uncertainty of the state action requirement.
This kind of mistake in legal reasoning has long been recognized:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have
precisely the same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It
has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.
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The Fourth Circuit's discussion of whether the foster parents
were state actors was relevant to the plaintiff's claims against the
foster parents themselves. 129 Such a state-action inquiry could
also be relevant to claims against a county and its department of
social services, but only insofar as such claims were made under
Monell v. Department of Social Services,' 0 alleging that a policy or
custom of the county caused the foster parents to violate the child's
rights.' 3 ' To the extent, however, that the plaintiff was proceeding under a DeShaney-type special-relationship theory, to hold the
Department of Social Services or its social workers liable for their
failure to protect the child from abuse by his foster parents, the
question whether the foster parents were state actors was irrelevant.13 2 Just as the-other patients who attacked plaintiff Nicholas
Romeo were clearly not state actors in Youngberg,'3 3 those who
inflicted injury on Charles Milburn need not have been state actors
in order for the state to have been held liable for his injury under
a special-relationship theory.
Thus, the ambiguity inherent in the term "custody" raises significant problems when attempting to apply such a test to a specific fact
situation. Analyzing the state's duty toward foster children through
a state-created-danger test for special relationship raises less
ambiguity as to meaning and would result in more consistent
treatment of foster care cases. Under a state-created-danger test,
the analogy to Youngberg and Estelle is fairly straightforward. Just as

Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CANADIAN B. REV. 535, 575 (1959)
(quoting COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942)).
129 A claim against the foster parents does not involve a DeShany-type special
relationship inquiry because the foster parents are not being sued for their failure to
act, but their acts of abuse. Such a claim does, however, involve a state action inquiry
since it can be argued that the foster parents are private actors. This issue did not
come up in DeShaney because the defendants, the County Department ofSocial Services,
and employees thereof, were all clearly state actors. Joshua's father could not be named
as a defendant under § 1983 precisely because he was so clearly not a state actor.
130 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
131 No such claim was made in Milburn.
112 Thus, it is important to note that there are two possible theories under which a
child abused in foster care could attempt to hold a municipality or county liable for her
injuries. The first alleges that the county had a duty to act to protect the child from her
foster parents by virtue of the special relationship that was formed when the county
placed the child in foster care. This theory relies on Youngberg Estelle and footnote nine
in DeShaney. The second theory alleges that the foster parents are state actors and that
because their actions in abusing the child resulted from some county policy or custom,
the county is liable for the child's injuries under Monel.
133 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (1982).
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inmate Gamble would not have been unable to obtain medical care
but for the state having incarcerated him, and patient Romeo would
not have been injured by other patients at Pennhurst but for the
state having committed him, a foster child who suffers abuse by her
foster parents clearly would not have suffered such abuse but for
the state's affirmative act of placing her in the foster home. The
second prong of the DeShaney special relationship test, however, that
the plaintiff have been involuntarily subjected to state action, raises
an additional set of problems for the foster child-plaintiff, which are
discussed in the next section.
B. The InvoluntarinessRequirement as Applied to Children
Whether we read DeShaney to establish a custody test or a statecreated-danger test, the case appears to require that there be some
element of involuntary submission by the individual to state power
or authority in order to establish a special relationship. Youngberg
also included this notion. Justice Powell repeatedly noted throughout that opinion that Romeo had been "involuntarily" committed to
the institution,1 3 4 although there was no discussion as to what the
concept of "involuntary" might mean in reference to someone who
is severely mentally retarded. Similarly, the "snake-pit" line of cases,
establishing a special relationship based on state-created danger, all
13 5
involve coercive action by the state.
Determining whether a young child or an infant has consented
voluntarily to some action by the state is clearly problematic.
Children who are pre-verbal obviously cannot express their consent
or nonconsent. Even decisions to place older children are not
usually based on the child's opinion. 136 Most courts construing
the special relationship theory in the context of foster care translate
this question into whether or not the child was "voluntarily placed"
in foster care, meaning whether or not the parents signed an agreement consenting to the placement. Parents do act as proxy for their
children in making most decisions about their welfare. Arguably we
'34 See id. at 310, 313, 315, 316, 318, 321-22.

135See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,382 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that police
officer created the danger by arresting plaintiff-children's uncle and leaving children on
busy eight-lane highway).
16 One study found that 27% of children voluntarily placed in foster care were
opposed to the decision and that nearly half of all foster children were too young to
understand the reasons why they had been placed in foster care. See A. GRUBER,

CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE:

DESTITUTE, NEGLEcTED .... BETRAYED 141 (1978).
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should therefore view the voluntary placement of a child as a
situation in which the state's action has been consented to by both
the parent and the child. For several reasons, however, this is a
137
flawed analysis.
First, the Youngberg case itself, which serves as our central model
of a special relationship created by involuntary institutionalization,
involved a mother who essentially "voluntarily placed" her child in
state care. Romeo's mother petitioned the court asking that he be
admitted to a state institution for the mentally retarded because she
was unable to care for him or control his violence.1 38 Romeo, at
age thirty-three, had the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old
13 9
child and wa, incapable of consenting on his own behalf.
Therefore, pursuant to state law, a commitment hearing was held,
and he was "involuntarily committed" to Pennhurst State Hospital. 140 Thus, Youngberg, on its facts, supports the idea that a
placement consented to by a parent can establish a special relation141
ship.
Second, parents cannot generally act as a proxy for their
children in making decisions that affect the children's constitutional
rights, such as the fundamental right to an abortion, 142 the right
to procedural due process, 143 or, in certain circumstances, the
right to counsel. 144 It would be inconsistent with this principle
137 See Mushlin, supra note 9, at 237-42.
138 See Youngberg 457 U.S. at 309.
139 See id. at 309-10.
See id. at 310.
141 In fact, Youngberg has been interpreted as supporting a right to safety for
voluntarily committed patients as well. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children
v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We need not decide whether [plaintiffs]
are at [the institution] 'voluntarily' or 'involuntarily' because in either case they are
entitled to safe conditions and freedom from undue restraint."); Wilder v. City of New
York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 ( E.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying Youngberg to voluntarily
committed, emotionally disturbed adult); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson,
561 F. Supp. 470, 485 (D.N.D. 1982) ("An individual's liberty is no less worthy of
protection merely because he has consented to be placed in a situation of confinement."). DeShaney, however, has already caused at least one district court to reject this
interpretation. See Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258, 260 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(holding that voluntary resident of state facility for severely mentally retarded
individuals had no due process right to a safe environment).
142 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (holding
unconstitutional statute requiring parental consent for minor's abortion where mother's
life not threatened).
14s See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (holding that a child's right to
procedural due process before being committed to a mental hospital is not waived
simply because parent consents to commitment).
144 A number of state courts have held that a minor's right to counsel in
140
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to hold that in this instance a parent's consent on behalf of her
child causes the child to lose constitutional rights she would

otherwise possess.
Finally, even if consent to placement by the parent were
sufficient to vitiate a special relationship, it is not at all clear that a
parent's signature on a voluntary placement agreement reliably
indicates that the placement was in fact voluntary. Because middleand upper-class parents have the resources to arrange other
alternatives for the care of their children in the face of crisis, those
who place their children in state-run foster care are usually poor,
uneducated, and without the benefit of legal counsel when they sign
such agreements. 145 The extent to which such a parent at a time
of crisis may be subtly coerced or intimidated by a social worker
who, with the authority of the state behind her, confidently
pronounces placement to be "in the best interests of the child" is
impossible to measure.
Coercion may often take even more overt forms. The social
worker may threaten the parent with a longer placement or even
permanent removal of the child through court intervention if she
does not "cooperate" by signing the agreement. 14 6 Even if the
social worker is more honest in explaining to the parent that she
will be given a chance to convince a judge that she should be able
to keep her child, many parents may consider their chances of

winning a court case against a government agency to be slim at best
and will try to cut their losses by adopting a conciliatory stance
toward the agency. 1 47 Thus, even putting aside the question of

delinquency and dependency hearings cannot be waived by the parent where the
interests of parent and child are found to be adverse. See In re Manuel R., 207 Conn.
725, 733, 543 A.2d 719, 726 (1988); McBurrough v. Department of Human Resources,
150 Ga. App. 130, 131, 257 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1979); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child
Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. 371, 393, 324 A.2d 562, 573 (1974); see also MODELJUVENILE
COURT ACT § 26(a) (1968) ("If the interests of 2 or more parties conflict separate
counsel shall be provided ....").
145

See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
833-34 (1977); Musewicz, supranote 11, at 639; see also In re David R., 101 Misc. 2d 41,
42-43,420 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (regarding woman, fluent only in Spanish
who, without the aid of an interpreter, signed a voluntary placement agreement in
English
relinquishing custody of her grandchild).
146
See Mushlin, supranote 9, at 240; see also In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 640-41 (Del.
1986) (finding that 17-year old mother signed voluntary placement agreement on the
understanding that if she did sign, her child would stay with her and that if she did not
sign, the court would take him away).
147 See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest? 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 599, 601
(1973).
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the consent of the child, "voluntary" foster care placement may in
fact constitute coercive state action against the parent.
Moreover, voluntary placement agreements are typically valid for
only thirty days.148 In order to keep a child in foster care beyond
this initial period, the agency must obtain judicial approval of the
agreement. 149 At this point the placement is clearly authorized
by the coercive power of the state. Once such an order is entered,
the parent may no longer regain custody of her child merely by
revoking her consent to placement. Further, while the court orders
are frequently entered with the "agreement" of the parents, such an
agreement is often the result of a Hobson's choice. It is analogous
to a criminal defendant's voluntary plea of guilty. The plea is "a
bargain with the [state] for what is seen as the 'least bad' option." 150 Certainly, a prisoner who enters state custody by such a
plea is not considered to be voluntarily incarcerated and therefore
entitled to fewer constitutional protections.
While most of the courts that have considered the issue so far
have found a special relationship to exist between the state and
foster children, 15 1 those holdings are on shaky ground. First,
given the dominant reading of DeShaney as creating a custody test
for a special relationship, many courts will be particularly prone to
use an erroneous analysis, similar to that of the Fourth Circuit in
Milburn. Second, given the significance accorded to voluntary
placement agreements by the courts, relief under this theory is, in
practical terms, unavailable to most foster children. A careful
analysis of the DeShaney holding, as well as informed consideration
of the special situation of children and how voluntary placements
really work in practice, however, should lead courts to expand the
special relationship doctrine to all children in foster care.
Regarding the first prong of the special relationship test, courts
should recognize that simply asking whether or not the plaintiff is
in state custody will not yield any clear answers in the foster care
context, and additionally that such is not the appropriate test under
148 See Mushlin, supra note

9, at 238 n.209 (citingJoyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770,

773 (2d Cir. 1983)).
149

150

See id.

Id. at 238 n.210 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-39 (1970)).
" The only post-DeShaney decision so far to find no special relationship has been
Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of pre-DeShaney foster
care cases, see supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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DeShaney anyway. 15 2 Asking instead whether the state created the
danger faced by the foste:r child by its affirmative act of placing her
in foster care, in the same sense that the state created the danger
faced by the plaintiffs in Estelle and Youngberg by placing them in
institutions, leads to a clearer analysis and follows more accurately
the Supreme Court's analysis in DeShaney.
Regarding the second prong of the special relationship
test-whether the state acted without the plaintiff's consent-courts
should consider that the signing of a voluntary placement agreement may not in practice actually signify the consent of the child or
the parent. Even if a voluntary placement is in fact voluntary on the
part of the parent, Youngberg teaches us that such action by the
parent is not enough to vitiate the state's special relationship with
153
the child.
Thus, children abused in foster care should in virtually all cases
meet the requirements for a special relationship with the state.
They have been placed in foster care by the state, almost always
without their consent, and but for this placement, injury at the
hands of their foster parents would not have occurred.
III. EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO SAFETY BEYOND FOSTER CARE
After DeShaney, it appears that agency supervision in the form
of monthly visits by a social worker to the parents' home is not
sufficient to create an affirmative duty of protection toward a child,
while placing and maintaining a child in foster care may create such
a duty. This simple formula does not, however, address the many
other situations that may arise in the child-welfare context that fall
somewhere in between these two extremes. Agency intervention
takes many forms, some of which are more intensive than monthly
home visits by a social worker but not as extreme as the removal of
the child for placement in foster care. 154 Simply because the
minimal intervention in DeShaney was held not to create a special
relationship, it does not necessarily follow that other forms of
agency intervention, short of placement in foster care, will not rise
to the level necessary to create a special relationship.
152
15

See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.

154See Oren, supra note 1, at 678 (stating that "in child protection work the line
between legal custody and noncustodial supervision by the agency can be very
artificial").
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The following are all fact patterns that may arise in this gray
area between supervision and foster care, and thus present potential
due process claims that are not necessarily foreclosed by DeShaney:
* The agency allows a parent to visit her child at the foster
home. During one of these visits, the parent severely abuses the
child.
* A child in foster care is sent home for an overnight visit with
her parents, during which they severely abuse her.
* After a child has been in foster care for two years, the agency
decides it is safe to send her home to her parents. Shortly after
being returned home, she is severely abused.1 55
* After a child has been in foster care for two years, the agency
sends her home but retains legal custody. After being returned
home, she is severely abused.
* The agency removes a child from her home and places her
temporarily with relatives during which time the agency retains
court-authorized supervision (or legal custody) over the child. The
1 56
child is subsequently severely abused in the relative's home.
155 See Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1989) (Clifford, J, concurring)
(suggesting that the state's special-relationship duty under due process extends to a
child who after one-and-a-halfyears in foster care placement was returned to his mother
who 56then abused him).
1 See Hampton v. Motley, 911 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that children who
were removed from their mother's custody and placed with their paternal grandparents
and who then suffered abuse at the hands of their grandparents and their father, had
a substantive due process claim against the state based on a special relationship). But
see Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387,392 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no special
relationship that would render the state liable for injuries sustained by a child while in
the custody of his grandmother or mother with whom the child was placed after being
removed from the custody of his father).
These first five hypothetical cases could present the plaintiff with the possibility of
avoiding the special relationship issue altogether by arguing that the agency's action (in
arranging the visit, returning the child, or placing the child with the relative) directly
caused the child's injury. The existence of an intervening cause, in the form of the
private party who actually delivered the blows, dearly poses a serious problem to this
argument, but the Supreme Court's opinion in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285
(1980), suggests that it might not be insurmountable, given the right facts. The plaintiff
would also have to be able to assert that the action itself constituted a breach of duty,
probably at the level of deliberate indifference, see supra note 31, which would require
at a minimum that the agency had substantial reason to suspect the danger of abuse
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* As an alternative to placing the children of a mother and
father who are mentally retarded in foster care, the agency engages
in a program of intensive supervision. Social workers are at the
home forty hours per week helping the parents with parenting and
homemaking skills. After a year of such supervision, the children
157
are found to have been severely abused.
Applying the state-created-danger test to these fact patterns
means asking whether the injury would have occurred but for the
state's intervention. In the first example, one might be tempted to
conclude that if the parent beat the child during the visit, she
probably would have done the same had the child been left at home.
But what if the parent had never beaten the child before? What if
the child was taken away not because of parental abuse but because
the parent was homeless and unable to care for the child? What if
the parent beat the child because the stress and frustration of not
being able to find a home, and being told by judges and social
workers that she could not care for her own child, had pushed her
to the breaking point? What if she beat the child out of fear and
frustration at seeing her own child not respond to her nor obey her
and hearing her call a stranger "mommy?" 58 If these are the
causes of the parent's dysfunction, it becomes much more difficult
to view the state's intrusion into the family as completely unrelated
to the injury. At some point along this continuum, the state's

before returning the child or arranging the visit.
Even if this direct causation argument is not available, the fact that the chain of
causation from agency action to child's injury is shorter in these cases than in DeShaney
makes more convincing the plaintiffs argument that the state, by its action, created the
danger that the plaintiff faced and thus established a special relationship duty. (Under
this line of reasoning, the subsequent inquiries under standard tort analysis then
become: first, whether the agency's failure to act was a breach of duty, and second,
whether that breach caused the child's injury. See supra note 71.)
157 For a discussion by the Supreme Court of the relationship between the state and
a family subject to agency supervision that portrays such a family as being much more
actively shaped by state involvement than was the DeShaney family as portrayed by the
Court, see Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 990 (1990),
discussed supra at note 82.
Clearly, in addition to establishing a duty in each of these hypothetical cases, a
plaintiff would also have to show a breach of that duty, presumably by showing at a
minimum that the agency had reason to suspect that abuse would occur. See supra note
71. Here the focus is only on duty, as it is throughout this Comment.
158 For discussions of the emotional reactions of parents whose children are placed
in foster care, see Carbino, Group Work with NaturalParents in Permanency Planning
Soc. WORK WITH GROUPS, Winter 1982, at 7, 12; McAdams, The Parent in the Shadows,
51 CHILD WELFARE 51 (1972).
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intervention becomes so substantial that it is no longer possible to
simply subtract the state from the equation and honestly say what
would have happened without it.
By bringing these "gray area" right-to-protection lawsuits, in
which the effect of the agency's intervention on the child's situation
is more pronounced than it was in DeShaney, advocates may
encourage the courts to consider the continuum that exists between
supervision and foster care, and thus prevent the doctrine in this
area from evolving into a simplistic bright-line rule that foster care
creates a special relationship and supervision does not.
IV.

AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES BEYOND ENSURING PHYSICAL SAFETY

When there is a special relationship, do child welfare agencies
have any affirmative duties beyond ensuring physical safety? A
number of courts have found that the substantive due process cause
of action for failure to protect against physical injury extends to
emotional injury as well. 159 Perhaps more significantly, however,
two courts have recently been willing to extend the special-relationship duty of the state beyond protection to an affirmative duty to
assist children in foster care in exercising fundamental constitution160
al rights such as their right to family integrity and association.
A. The Duty to Assist in the Exercise of ConstitutionalRights
In Lipscomb v. Simmons,1 61 three foster children challenged the
state of Oregon's foster care funding scheme by which financial
assistance was provided only to children who were placed with
foster parents who were not related to them. 1 62 Under this
scheme, two of the plaintiffs lived with strangers because their
relatives, though willing to care for them, were financially unable to

159 See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that
aspects of emotional well-being are protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment); B.H. v.Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[A]
child who is in the state's custody has a substantive due process right to be free from
unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions on both its physical and emotional wellbeing."); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1184 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding unconstitutional inadequate shelter and treatment of foster children).
160 See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1248-50 (9th Cir. 1989), reh'ggranted,
907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Aristotle P. v.Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 100910 ( N.D. Ill. 1989), leave to appeal granted, No. 88 C 7919 (N.D. I11. Oct. 3, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
161 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
162 See id. at 1243.
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meet the children's needs. 1 63 The third was in danger of having
to leave her aunt and uncle's home because they could not receive
164
foster care payments and thus were unable to provide for her.
The Ninth Circuit held that the state had a special-relationship duty
toward children in foster care and that this duty encompassed not
only an obligation to ensure their safety but also to "assist the
children to exercise their constitutional rights. " 1 65 In this instance, therefore, the state was required to fund foster care placements with relatives so as to enable the children to exercise their
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in choosing to live with
16 6
family members."
The court relied primarily on prison cases which held that
prison officials have an affirmative duty to assist prisoners in the
exercise of their right to abortion, 167 the observance of religious
dietary laws, 1 68 and access to the courts. 1 6 9 It concluded that
"[t]he State's obligation to ensure that children in its custody are
able to exercise their constitutional rights is even greater than its
responsibility toward prisoners" since foster children are in the
state's custody not because of their own misdeeds but "solely
170
because they were the victims of abuse by others."
In Aristotle v. Johnso, 17 1 Judge Williams of the Northern
District of Illinois reached a similar conclusion, holding that under
the due process clause, the state has an affirmative duty to assist
163 See id.
164See id.
165 Id. at 1246.
166 Id. at 1244. Citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"), Quillinv. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978)
(stating that "the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"),
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (noting that "freedom
of personal choice, in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"), and Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion) (declaring that
constitutional protection extends beyond the nuclear family), the court found this right
to associate with relatives in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Lipscomb, 884 F.2d at 1244.
167 See Lipscomb, 884 F.2d at 1246 (citing Monmouth County Correctional
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1006

(1988)).
168 See id. at 1246-47 (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987);
Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Pa. 1980)).
169 See id. at 1248 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
170 Id. at 1247.
171 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. 11. 1989).
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foster children in exercising their right to family association by
providing visits with siblings who are separately placed.
While these two cases effected fairly narrow and specific changes
in the respective state child welfare systems, the principle articulated, if followed, could lead to much broader claims for services on
behalf of foster children and their families. If the state must fund
placements with relatives and provide visitation with siblings, it
logically follows that its duty to assist foster children in exercising
this constitutional right to family association also embraces an
obligation to ensure the provision of substantive services (such as
housing, daycare, or drug treatment) that are necessary to reunite
foster children with their parents.
Three months prior to Lipscomb and Aristotle, such a claim
brought by foster children seeking reunification services was
172
rejected by the Northern District of Illinois in B.H. v. Johnson.
Several months after Lipscomb and Aristotle, however, another
Northern District of Illinois court held that the state's specialrelationship duty toward foster children does require the state to do
more than ensure the physical safety of foster children. In this case,
Artist M. v. Johnson, 173 the court found a due process obligation
on the part of the state to ensure that case workers were promptly
assigned to children in foster care.
Such claims for reunification services mirror the mandate of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,174 which
requires states receiving federal money under the Act to make
715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In this case, a class of foster children
challenged virtually all aspects of the child welfare system: from abuse and neglect in
foster care and the failure to provide services to reunite families, to high caseloads and
the agency's failure to react quickly to reports of abuse and neglect. In addition to the
substantive due process claim, plaintiffs also made procedural due process claims and
federal statutory claims under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629, 670-679 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Judge Grady did find a special
relationship to exist, such that foster children have a substantive due process right to
be "free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions upon their physical and
emotional well-being... and to be provided by the state with adequate food, shelter,
clothing and medical care and minimally adequate training to secure these basic constitutional rights," Artist M., 715 F. Supp. at 1396, but was unwilling to extend this right
to parental and sibling visitation and reunification services, see id. at 1396-97.
'73 726 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1989). While holding that a special-relationship duty
did exist, the court nonetheless dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim,
holding that the state's conduct did not rise to the level of "complete indifference to a
known significant risk" necessary to trigger the protection of the due process clause.
See id. at 700. The court did, however, uphold the plaintiffs' claim under the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. See id. at 697.
17442 U.S.C. §§ 620-629, 670-679 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
172
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"reasonable efforts" to reunite foster children with their parents by
providing appropriate services. 175
Claiming a right to such
services directly under the Act may, however, be problematic. A
number of courts have held that the Act creates a cause of action
only to enforce its procedural aspects (such as the requirement that
case plans be written for each foster child and periodically reviewed).' 76 Other courts have also held that damages are not
available under the Act. 177 Thus, the substantive due process
theory endorsed in Lipscomb, Aristotle, and Artist M. may provide a
useful alternative method to force child welfare agencies to comply
with their mandate to provide the substantive services necessary to
reunite foster children with their families.

B. The Duty to Provide Care and Services Distinguishedfrom the
Duty to Protectfrom Private Violence
A state's duty to protect individuals from private violence can be
distinguished from its duty to provide care and services. DeShaney
178
clearly involved the former as do the foster care abuse cases.
175 The Act provides, in relevant part:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have
a plan approved by the Secretary which . .. (15) ... provides that, in each
case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home ....
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1982).
176 See, e.g., B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1401. But see Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp.
1182 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (holding that the Act's "reasonable efforts" requirement that
substantive services be provided to families is enforceable); ArtistM., 726 F. Supp. at 695
(stating that "if private plaintiffs have the right ... to enforce their statutory
entitlements to case plans and case reviews, the rights of the plaintiff class here to
obtain
preventive and reunification services must enjoy the same standing").
177 See Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[D]amages are not
available in a § 1983 action alleging a violation of the Adoption Assistance Act.");
Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that "whatever rights the
Adoption Assistance Act might confer on parents, relief nullifying a prior state court
judgment of child neglect or dependency, or awarding damages in connection
therewith, would not be available"); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp.
1152, 1203 (D. Minn. 1987) (holding that "the failure of defendants to comply with the
statutory requirements pertaining to foster care is not actionable in a damages action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the context of home removals resulting from suspected child
sexual abuse"). But see LJ. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the Adoption Assistance Act provides a private remedy for damages as well as
prospective equitable relief), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989);Joseph A. v. New Mexico
Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346, 354 (D.N.M. 1983) (same).
178 See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 791 F.2d 881 (l1th Cir. 1986), aff'd inpar rev'd in
part on reh g 818 F.2d 791 (l1th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337
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Estelle, however, which established a duty to provide medical care,
falls in the latter category, as do Lipscomb and Aristotle. Youngberg
involved both protection (from the violence of other inmates) and
care (adequate food, clothing, and training). Should these two
duties be treated the same for purposes of special relationship

analysis?
When an individual requests state protection, the harm from
which she seeks protection comes from a clearly identifiable source
other than the state. The source of Joshua's injuries, for example,
was his father. 179 When an individual requests care or services
from the state, however, the source of the harm those services will
alleviate is more abstract; it may be disease or poverty. To protect
the first individual from actions of a third party, the state must
inevitably restrain the liberty of the third party in some way.
Protecting Joshua DeShaney, for instance, would have required
interfering with his father's liberty interest in raising his child.
Since such direct and active governmental interference with liberty
is exactly what the due process clause most clearly proscribes, courts
have reason to be particularly hesitant in imposing such a duty to
protect.
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this hesitation in DeShaney:
[I]t must also be said that had [the state] moved too soon to take
custody of the son away from the father, [it] would likely have
been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parentchild relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause
that forms the basis for the present charge of failure to provide
80
adequate protection.
Thus, the duty of protection potentially sets two constitutional
imperatives against each other: the liberty interest of the child to
be free from harm and the liberty interest of the third party to be
free from governmental interference.
A duty to provide care or services does not present this problem
of conflicting constitutional mandates since there is no identifiable

(1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Brooks
v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
179 See DeShany, 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
180 Id. at 1007. The social worker's dilemma is perhaps exaggerated here by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. The standard of care creates a sizable zone of safety, in that an error
in either direction that does not rise at least to the level of gross negligence, or perhaps
deliberate indifference, will not result in liability. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

333 (1986).
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source of harm. Provision of medical care to a prisoner or
reunification services to a foster child does not require the state to
impose restraints on a third party's liberty. This observation
suggests that we should be more willing to impose a duty of care on
the state than a duty of protection, 1 81 and that perhaps the
special-relationship test should be different in the two instances.
Under this analysis, DeShaney is only binding precedent as to the
duty of protection, and advocates asserting a duty to provide care
or services are free to argue for a broader definition of a special
1 82
relationship.
V. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS LEFT OPEN BY DESHANEY
83
Other than the alternative of suing under state tort law,1
which Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested would have been the most
appropriate recourse for the plaintiffs in DeShaney, the opinion
leaves open several other constitutional claims for plaintiffs seeking
to impose affirmative duties on child welfare agencies. Depending
on the facts involved, children injured as a result of agency inaction
may be able to allege violations of their equal protection or
procedural due process rights.
First, as the Court pointed out, a plaintiff who is a member of
a disfavored minority can make a claim under the equal protection
clause that she was selectively denied protective services because of
her disfavored status. 184 Additionally, even plaintiffs who are not

181But see Currie, supra note 4.4, at 875 (observing that the contract clause of the

Constitution requires some governmental protection against third parties but not
against poverty or disease).
182 Lower courts so far have not made this distinction, but instead have applied

DeShaney with full force to substantive due process claims asserting a duty to provide
services. See, e.g., Alessi v. Commonwealth of Pa., 893 F.2d 1444, 1448 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding no duty to provide residential treatment services to mentally retarded
individuals); Edwards v.Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir.
1989) (finding no duty to ensure safe and sanitary housing); Philadelphia Police & Fire
Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 166-68 (3d
Cir. 1989) (finding no duty to continue providing services to mentally retarded
individuals who live at home).
183 Depending on state law, such suits may be barred by sovereign immunity, or the
amount of damages may be limited. In Wisconsin, for example, where the DeShaney
case arose, damages in state tort suits are limited to $50,000. See WIs. STAT. § 893.80(3)
(1983).
'84 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3. This type of claim has been brought against
police departments by adult women who have been victims of domestic violence and

allege that the police department's failure to respond to domestic violence calls as
quickly as to reports of other types of assaults violates equal protection. See, e.g.,
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members of a suspect class may in some instances be able to argue
that they have been subject to arbitrary and capricious governmental
action in violation of the equal protection clause. It is well
established that governmental action that arbitrarily singles out
individuals and treats them less favorably than others similarly
situated violates the equal protection clause under the minimum
scrutiny of the rational basis standard.18 5
It is possible that this kind of equal protection argument could
be made in a DeShaney-type situation. Admittedly, in most child
protection cases such minimum scrutiny would be easy for the state
to overcome; if the agency could make any reasonable assertion that
the decision to ignore or give less attention to a case was based on
a social worker's judgment, the claim would fail. The best factual
situation for the assertion of such a claim, therefore, would be one
in which the plaintiff's case "fell through the cracks" and was
ignored purely because of administrative error, rather than one that
received consideration by a social worker. Where it is possible to
demonstrate that other similarly situated children have received
greater protection and that the source of the disparate treatment is
entirely arbitrary, this type of equal protection claim may lie even
in the absence of invidious discrimination.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 1 86 the Supreme Court
indicated that this kind of arbitrary administrative action taken
pursuant to a facially neutral law could constitute an equal protection violation. That case involved a plaintiff who filed a complaint
before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Under
the state statute, the Commission had 120 days after the filing of the
complaint to convene a fact-finding conference. Because the
Commission, through inadvertence, failed to schedule the conference within the specified time limit, the plaintiff's claim was
dropped. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on
procedural due process grounds, but a majority of the Court also
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). But see McKee v.
City of Rockwell, 877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the
police department's failure to respond to domestic violence calls violated equal
protection on the grounds that plaintiffs cannot circumvent DeShaney by converting a
due process claim into an equal protection claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990).
o See e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972) (holding that the double

bond prerequisite for appealing an action under the Oregon Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute violated the equal protection clause under the minimum rationality
standard because it granted appeals to some litigants while "arbitrarily" and "capricious-

ly" denying them to others).
186 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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indicated in dicta that the state's action violated the equal protection clause. Although the statute on its face did not make explicit
classifications, 187 in effect it operated to divide claimants into two
categories: those whose claims were processed within 120 days and
those whose claims were not. The Court majority found that this
distinction did not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate
governmental objective. Even though there was no creation of a
suspect class that would have triggered strict scrutiny, this arbitrary
division of claimants violated equal protection even under the
minimum scrutiny, rational-basis standard. 188
Another argument made by the plaintiffs but not considered by
the Court 189 was that the "Wisconsin child protection statutes gave
Joshua an entitlement to child protective services subject to
procedural due process protections. 190 Under Board of Regents v.
Roth, 19 1 benefits conferred by state statute may, depending on the
statutory language, constitute an individual entitlement, which is
considered to be a property interest and thus not subject to
restriction by the state without due process of law.' 92 In order
for a statutorily conferred benefit to be treated as a property
interest, the statute must condition receipt of the benefit on the
existence of certain facts which are ascertainable at a due process
hearing.193 Where a statute leaves the issuance of benefits to the
discretion of state officials, however, no property interest is created.
In Taylor v. Ledbetter,19" the plaintiffs successfully brought such

187 While Justice Blackmun noted that this made the equal protection claim "an

unconventional one," id. at 438, the idea that a facially neutral law may violate equal
protection because of unequal administration of that law is not new. See Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
188The plaintiffs in DeShaney did cite Logan in their brief to the Supreme Court, but
it is not clear whether they were citing it as a due process or equal protection case.
Their assertion was that "Joshua had a protected liberty interest in his equal access to
the services which the state and county undertook to provide for all endangered
children, on a basis which did not arbitrarily single him out for grossly negligent and
deliberately indifferent 'protection.'" Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 23. The
Court did not address this argument in the DeShaney opinion.
189 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at :1003 n.2.
190 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 20, at 24-29.
191408 U.S. 564 (1972).
192 See id. at 578. A plaintiff claiming entitlement to protection (like Joshua

DeShaney) might also claim a liberty interest subject to due process protection. See id.
at 572 (discussing broad due process protection afforded liberty interests); see also Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 481 (1980) ("[T]he involuntary transfer of [a prisoner] to a
mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
193 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578-79.
194 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cent. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989)
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a claim, arguing that state statutes and regulations governing foster
care in Georgia required child welfare officials to follow specific
guidelines to ensure the well-being and safety of children in foster
care. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statutory scheme in
Georgia created an entitlement to the state's protection from
harm. 19 5 Thus, the state's withholding of such protection without
96
procedural due process violated the fourteenth amendment.
Similar procedural due process claims have been rejected, however,
in two recent suits brought by foster children in the Northern
District of Illinois, 197 and in a recent Seventh Circuit decision in
a case with facts similar to those in DeShaney.198 Since these
holdings are rooted in the state law of Illinois, however, these cases
do not preclude procedural due process claims in other jurisdic19 9
tions.
CONCLUSION

Lawsuits seeking to hold child protective agencies liable in
damages for their most egregious mistakes are an important tool for
ensuring a minimally adequate level of competence among those
whom we charge with the immeasurably important task of protecting our children. The DeShaney case has significantly reduced the
possibility of bringing many such actions in federal court. If
advocates and judges pay close attention to what was actually stated
(Certiorari was denied only 11 days after the Court decided DeShaney.).
195 See id. at 800.
196 See id

197 See B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989); K.H. v. Morgan, No. 87
C 9833 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (dismissing a
procedural due process claim because plaintiff did not have a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to the requested benefits), affrd in part remanded in par4 914 F.2d 848
(1990).
198 See Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499,502-03 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Wisconsin law did not create a property interest in having the child welfare agency
conduct an investigation of a report of suspected child abuse because the statute only
specified a set of procedures that the agency had to follow, and procedures in and of
themselves are not benefits subject to due process protection).
199 Also of potential interest to the child welfare plaintiff is a recent decision in a
wife-abuse case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In Coffman v. Wilson Police
Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990), the court held that though the
Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act itself did not create a property interest in
police protection for battered women, a protective order issued by a court pursuant to
the Act did create such a property interest. A parallel argument might be made by a
child abused while in the custody of her parents but subject to a court order directing
the child welfare agency to supervise the child.
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by the Supreme Court in DeShaney, however, that opinion need not
foreclose relief under the due process clause in as many instances
as some have assumed.
A number of decisions since DeShaney have already found a
special-relationship duty under the due process clause to protect
foster children in some ci:rcumstances. Under a careful reading of
DeShaney, with sensitivity to the special considerations surrounding
children and the practical realities of foster care placement, the
principle of these cases can be construed to cover all children in
foster care. DeShaney may also leave room for this duty to be
applied in other situations in which an agency's intrusion into a
family is substantial. Furthermore, there may still be an opportunity
to construe this duty as one to provide care and services to children
and their families in addition to physical protection. Finally, there
are other claims under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment that were left untouched by DeShaney
and that remain available to plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on
child welfare agencies for their failure to act.

